

SECRET

26 February 1955

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

General Mark Clark called to see me by appointment at 4 P. M. on 17 February 1955 and we had a talk slightly over an hour and a half. General Cabell, Frank Wisner and Kermit Roosevelt joined us for the last half hour of the conversation.

General Clark stated that he wished to arrange a general briefing for the entire Task Force covering our operations sometime toward the end of March and he would shortly suggest a definite date for it. This would, of course, be after the return of all those who had gone to the field to look at operations there. He suggested that among the types of items he would like to have covered, would be some of the following:

- 1) What do we know of Soviet intentions;
- 2) What particular intelligence successes have we had;
- 3) The work of the Watch Committee and its reports;
- 4) What intelligence do we give to the President and high policy officials;
- 5) How do we influence policy;
- 6) Our National Estimates.

In addition, I asked whether he would like to have some information on certain operations and mentioned Guatemala, Iran and the development of Magsaysay, etc. He felt this would be useful.

I said that we would coordinate with General <sup>Christiansen</sup> and draw up an agenda for the briefing which we would submit to him for approval. (At this stage I did not raise the question of clearances of all of the Task Force for all of our operations, but believe this is a matter which should be cleared at this highest level.)

General Clark referred to my communications to him about the McCarthy material. He said that he had looked it over and indicated that he did not consider it of any great significance. He said, however, that McCarthy had promised to look through his papers and that he had quite a lot more he would want to give to the Clark Committee. General Clark added that nothing further had come recently. I clearly gained the impression that General Clark did not feel that anything was disclosed in the papers which required immediate action by CIA. I made it entirely clear to him that if such was the case, I would want to investigate it immediately.

I also took up with General Clark the necessity for insuring that highly classified documents were not included in any reports which were given any circulation, and naturally not in reports which would get publicity through being submitted to the entire Hoover Committee with its large representation from the Congress. The General indicated that he was fully aware of the problem and would see that any classified material was properly handled.

The balance of the conversation was a rather desultory discussion of intelligence problems. I mentioned to him certain signal successes and showed him some of the material recently obtained, i. e., the Manual. He did not seem much impressed with this and said that from the table of content, it looked like the same sort of thing which our Army produced and which was practically unclassified. I pointed out that the Manual was "Secret."

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The meeting was friendly enough, but rather fruitless and inconclusive. The General remarked during the course of the conversation, in reply to my offer whether he wished to read the Doolittle Report, that he had read it, but would probably wish to look at it again when their own report was further along. I got the impression that he did not wish to be "influenced" by the report. The statement that he had read the Doolittle Report is not accurate as he only had the document in his hands for some 20 minutes and then together with certain other documents, which I believe he gave higher priority and indicated that he had also read. Of course the Doolittle Report could not be read in 20 minutes.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Director

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